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Abstract
Reward-related mesolimbic dopamine is thought to play an important role in guiding animal behaviour, biasing approach
towards potentially beneficial environmental stimuli and away from objects unlikely to garner positive outcome. This is
considered to result in part from an impact on perceptual and attentional processes: dopamine initiates a series of cognitive
events that result in the priming of reward-associated perceptual features. We have provided behavioural and
electrophysiological evidence that this mechanism guides human vision in search, an effect we refer to as reward priming.
We have also demonstrated that there is substantial individual variability in this effect. Here we show that behavioural
differences in reward priming are predicted remarkably well by a personality index that captures the degree to which a
person’s behaviour is driven by reward outcome. Participants with reward-seeking personalities are found to be those who
allocate visual resources to objects characterized by reward-associated visual features. These results add to a rapidly
developing literature demonstrating the crucial role reward plays in attentional control. They additionally illustrate the
striking impact personality traits can have on low-level cognitive processes like perception and selective attention.
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Introduction
Reward signals encoded in mesolimbic dopamine are thought to
guide animal approach behavior, biasing animals towards objects
associated with prior reward and away from objects associated
with sub-optimal outcome. Some theories of dopamine, like the
incentive salience hypothesis of Berridge and Robinson [1], suggest that
this is instantiated in biases of perception and attention. The idea
is that release of mesolimbic dopamine causes a chain of events
that leads to facilitated processing of reward-conditioned percep-
tual features. Attention is thus guided to environmental stimuli
that are likely to garner positive outcomes [1–5].
This framework has been influential in the reinforcement
learning literature and has been applied to human behavior in
clinical settings like addiction research [6], but has not been widely
adopted in the psychological investigation of attention (though see
[7,8]). Psychological and neuroscientific models of attentional
control often characterize attention as under the combined
influence of exogenous factors, directing attention towards salient
stimuli, and endogenous factors, biasing attention towards task-
relevant stimuli [9,10]. Reward’s role in this framework is
generally seen as an indirect influence on the strategic establish-
ment of top-down set.
We have recently reported results from a series of experiments
that suggest this perspective greatly underestimates the impact
reward can have on visual attention [11,12]. We had participants
complete visual search experiments based on the additional singleton
paradigm of Theeuwes [13] (see Figure 1). In this type of task
participants search for a uniquely shaped target - known in the
literature as a shape singleton - presented among a number of
homogenous distractors. The target is sometimes the only unique
object in the search array, but in other trials a color singleton is defined
by giving one of the distractors unique color (often red when all
other stimuli are green or vice versa). The pervasive finding is that
participants are slower to discriminate features of the shape
singleton target when the color singleton distractor is present in
the display, and this has been linked to the capture of attention to
the location of the color singleton [13–15] (note that there is
ongoing debate regarding this issue, see [16,17] for recent reviews).
We modified this paradigm slightly, adding high-magnitude (10
points) or low-magnitude (1 point) reward feedback at the end of
every correct trial. Participants were instructed to maximize the
number of points they received and were paid based on this
number, but in fact reward magnitude was not tied to performance
in any way: so long as participants responded correctly, they were as
equally likely to receive high-magnitude reward as low.
Our analysis centered on two features of the experimental
design. First, the colors that defined the target in any given trial
could either be the same as those in the previous trial (as when the
target was red and the unique distractor was green in both trial n
and trial n-1), or could have swapped (as when the target was red
and the unique distractor was green in trial n but the target was
green and the unique distractor was red in trial n-1; see also [18]).
Second, participants could receive either high or low-magnitude
reward following each trial. Our expectation was that high-
magnitude reward would facilitate subsequent processing of the
features that defined the target such that attention was biased
towards these features in the next trial. Participants should
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therefore respond quickly when the same color characterizes the
target as did so in the preceding trial. In contrast, when the colors
swap, the color associated with reward will come to define the
distractor. As a result, the likelihood of attention being captured to
the distractor location should increase and reaction times (RTs)
should become slower. This pattern was borne out in the data and
- to foreshadow - is replicated in the present study (see Figure 2).
Importantly, this does not appear to reflect a strategic propensity;
we find that subjects erroneously select objects characterized by
reward-conditioned features even when a much better strategy is
available to them [11, Exp 1]. We refer to this automatic bias as
reward priming.
We have conducted an event-related potential (ERP) study of
reward priming [11, Exp 2], and results from this work confirmed
our notion that perceptual and attentional processing of objects
characterized by reward-associated visual features is facilitated.
We found that the magnitude of an early-latency index of visual
perception – the lateralized P1 [19] – was larger in in response to a
singleton defined by a color associated with high-magnitude
reward, and that a later index of attentional selection - the N2pc
[19] – was elicited by the object characterized by the reward-
associated color. These effects were observed in response to the
stimulus characterized by the reward-associated color regardless of
task relevance. This last point bears repetition: perceptual and
attentional processing of the target was facilitated when the target
was characterized by the color linked to high-magnitude reward in
the preceding trial, whereas perceptual and attentional processing
of the unique distractor was facilitated when this object was
defined by the reward-associated color. No corresponding effects
were observed in response to low-magnitude reward feedback.
Our electrophysiological work garnered an additional outcome:
the magnitude of an anterior ERP component elicited by high-
magnitude reward feedback – the medial frontal negativity (MFN;
[20]) - predicted the size of the reward priming effect on a per-
subject basis. Consistent with prior source analysis [20], we
localized the MFN to anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and showed
that participants with increased reward-related activity in this
brain area were more strongly biased towards reward-conditioned
visual features. This led us to suggest that participants who show
strong reward priming do so because they are especially sensitive
to the motivational impact of reward. To clarify, we thought that
people who showed greater reward-related activity in ACC might
be those with reward-seeking personalities, and that these people
may show an increased propensity to attend to stimuli character-
ized by reward-associated features.
The current study was designed to test this hypothesis. We used
a personality inventory to measure trait reward-seeking in
participants before having them complete the search task
described above. Our expectation was that those participants
who show greater trait propensity to reward-driven behavior
would be those who show a larger reward priming effect.
The personality inventory we used was the Behavioral Inhibition
System/Behavioral Activation System scale (BIS/BAS) of Carver and
White [21]. This scale was developed based on the theoretical work
of Gray [22,23], who proposed that affect and behavior could be
best understood as the outcome of two neurological systems (or
perhaps three: Gray suggested the presence of a third fight or flight
system [23], but often placed theoretical emphasis on the BIS and
BAS). The BIS is thought to be largely instantiated in the
septohippocampal system, with input from prefrontal cortex,
noradrenergic output through the locus coeruleus, and serotonergic
output through the median raphe [22,24–26]. High BIS scores have
been associated with traits like anxiety and neuroticism, and the
system is thought to be generally responsible for inhibition and the
establishment of control in response to punishment, sub-optimal
outcome, fear, and novelty [21]. In contrast, the BAS is thought to
be instantiated in dopaminergic structures, including mesencephalic
nuclei like the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area, and
dopaminergic target sites in the basal ganglia, thalamus, and cortex
[22,24–26]. High BAS scores suggest extraversion, impulsivity,
novelty seeking, and positive affect [21]. Importantly, Gray
proposed that the fundamental responsibility of the BAS system is
the initiation of reward-seeking behavior [25,27].
Carver and White’s [21] inventory of BIS/BAS sensitivity is a
24-item questionnaire in which participants indicate the degree to
which they agree with simple statements (e.g., ‘‘I go out of my way
Figure 1. General paradigm. Target and salient distractor denoted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014087.g001
Figure 2. Behavioural results from the visual search task. Error
bars reflect within-subject 95% confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014087.g002
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to get the things I want’’). Large-sample factor analysis has
identified two primary dimensions in the results, corresponding to
BIS and BAS sensitivity, and three BAS subdimensions: BASdrive,
BASfun seeking, and BASreward responsiveness [21]. Two of the three
BAS subscales - BASdrive and BASreward responsiveness – index reward
processing personality traits (with BASfun seeking reflecting some-
thing akin to trait novelty-seeking). However, an important
distinction needs to be made between these subscales. BASreward
responsiveness indexes the degree to which a person derives pleasure
from reward; a person scoring high on this measure might
particularly enjoy a fine wine. In contrast, BASdrive captures the
strength with which reward outcome guides subsequent behavior;
prior experience of a good wine might drive a person scoring high
on this measure to develop a fine wine cellar (or rob a liquor store)
[21,30]. There is a clear relationship between these constructs, and
the corresponding measures correlate accordingly, but factor
analysis demonstrates that they are discrete: some individuals are
strongly motivated to behave in a manner that garners good
outcome without showing a corresponding increase in the pleasure
derived from that outcome (and vice versa) [21]. BASdrive has
accordingly been used as a measure of trait reward-seeking in
other studies of cognitive phenomena [28,29,30].
The distinction between BASdrive and BASreward responsiveness has a
parallel in the incentive salience hypothesis [1]. Berridge and
Robinson describe an animal as ‘liking’ a reward when they have a
strong hedonic experience, but ‘wanting’ a reward when they are
driven to behave in a manner that will result in its consumption.
Importantly, the incentive salience hypothesis proposes that the
primary cognitive responsibility of dopamine is the creation of
‘wanting’, not ‘liking’. Given that BASdrive appears to index much
the same underlying construct as ‘wanting’, we approached the
current experiment with particular interest in the BASdrive subscale.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-seven neurologically typical students of the Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam gave informed consent before participa-
tion. Data from one participant was discarded due to high error rate
(.2 standard deviations from the mean). Data from an additional
participant was discarded due to incorrect completion of the BIS/
BAS inventory. This participant made the same response to all but
the first two of the inventory items and responded to many of the
items with speeds inconsistent with the questions having been read
or adequately considered. Two of the remaining 35 participants (6
men; age 20.4+/22.3 years, mean +/2 SD) were left-handed. All
participants were paid for their participation.
All research was approved by the Vrije Universiteit Faculty of
Psychology ethics board and conducted according to the principles
of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental stimuli and procedure
The experiment took place in a sound-attenuated room and all
stimuli were presented to participants via a CRT monitor located
60 cm from the eyes. The experiment began with completion of a
computerized version of the Dutch translation of the BIS/BAS
inventory [31]. This was followed by detailed instructions
regarding the visual search task.
The search task was very similar to that employed in prior
studies [13,14], with the addition of reward feedback at the end of
every trial (see Figure 1). Participants viewed stimulus arrays
consisting of 10 shapes presented in a circle formation. Each shape
was 9.1u of visual angle away from a central fixation point and 5.6u
away from each of its two neighboring stimuli. The shapes were
unfilled diamonds (4.2u64.2u) and circles (1.7u radius) outlined
thinly (0.3u) in red or green. A gray line (0.3u61.5u) that could be
randomly oriented either vertically or horizontally was presented
in the center of each item.
The color and shape of the 10 stimuli were pseudo-randomly
varied within the following confines. In each trial one of the
objects was different in shape from the other nine. This could
mean that a diamond was presented among circles or that a circle
was presented among diamonds. In a quarter of trials this shape
singleton was the only unique stimulus in the display, but in the
remaining trials an additional singleton was defined by giving one
of the identically shaped objects unique color (either red when
everything else was green or vice versa). All stimuli were presented
on a black background. Stimuli locations were randomized with
the sole confine that the shape singleton could not also be of
unique color.
Participants completed 30 blocks of 30 trials, which took
approximately one hour. Each trial began with the presentation
of a fixation point for a duration of 400 to 1400 ms followed by the
presentation of a visual search array. Participant response was based
on orientation of the line contained within the shape singleton;
instructions were to press the ‘z’ key on a standard computer
keyboard with their left index finger when the target line was
vertical and the ‘m’ key with their right index finger when the target
line was horizontal, and to do so as quickly as possible while
maintaining an average accuracy of 90% or better. Feedback
regarding accuracy and response latency was provided at the end of
each experimental block. Participants were instructed to maintain
eye fixation throughout the experiment and informed that eye
movements were being periodically monitored via closed circuit
camera. Correct responses to the search target were immediately
followed by the replacement of the central fixation dot with an
indication of reward feedback in blue text (65 point font; 5u height),
either ‘+10’, denoting the receipt of 10 points, or ‘+1’, denoting the
receipt of 1 point. The visual search display remained onscreen
during the presentation of feedback and the search display and
feedback were presented together for 1000 ms. Each point had a
value of ,0.2 euro cents and participants were paid based on the
number of points they received. Because reward magnitude was
random, the only performance factor that impacted earnings was
accuracy. In the majority of participants accuracy was excellent,
meaning that there was very little variability in pay: all subjects
received 8 euro or more for participation.
Results
BIS/BAS scale
The BIS/BAS inventory results were consistent with those
reported in other studies ([21,29,30]; mean BIS: 19.49+/24.57
SD; BAStotal: 13.84+/21.624; BASdrive: 12.23+/21.83; BASfun:
11.40+/22.14; BASreward: 17.89+/22.25). The BIS and BAS are
theoretically orthogonal constructs [23] and prior results indicate
that there is little in the way of a reliable relationship between
measured BIS and measured BAS [21]. Our results were
consistent with this; BIS correlated 20.157 with BAStotal. BAS
subscales showed a stronger relationship (BASdrive to BASfun seeking
0.305; BASdrive to BASreward responsiveness 0.546; BASfun seeking to
BASreward responsiveness 0.241). Note that correlation values here and
throughout this paper reflect Spearman’s r, which is less sensitive
to outlier values than other measures of correlation.
Visual Search
Consistent with earlier research [13], participants were slower
(840 ms vs. 787 ms; t(34) = 9.00, p,0.001) when the distractor
Reward Guides Vision
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singleton was present in the display (accuracy: 96.3% vs. 96.6%,
t(34) = 1.08, n.s.).
As described in the Introduction, we were interested in
comparing trials in which the target and distractor colors were
either the same as they had been in the immediately preceding trial
or had swapped. We limited analysis to trials in which the distractor
was present in the display and response in the immediately
preceding trial had been correct. Given that novel singletons [32]
and new objects [33] will disrupt search to the greatest degree, we
maximized our ability to detect the impact of the salient distractor
by only analyzing trials in which the salient distractor was absent in
the preceding trial. Furthermore, based on the observation of large
costs related to response switch in this paradigm, we analyzed trials
in which the response had not changed from the previous trial. A
total of 9.5% of the selected trials were excluded from RT analysis:
5.1% because they were excessively slow (.1600 ms) and 4.6%
because they resulted in incorrect response. This already-low error
rate stemmed from a handful of participants; many participants
made next-to-no errors in the experiment.
As illustrated in Figure 2, the receipt of high-magnitude reward
caused strong priming: participants were fast to respond when the
previous trial garnered high-magnitude reward and the color
defining the current target was the same as that of the target in the
previous trial. In contrast, participants were slow when the
previous trial garnered high-magnitude reward and the target
color in the previous trial now came to define the distractor. This
pattern was statistically assessed in a repeated-measures analysis of
variance (RANOVA) with factors for Color Swap (same vs. swap)
and Reward Magnitude (low vs. high). This revealed a marginally
significant main effect of Color Swap (F(1,34) = 3.158, p = 0.085,
g2p = 0.085), no effect of Reward Magnitude (F,1), and an
interaction between the factors (F(1,34) = 4.944, p = 0.034,
g2p = 0.127). This replicates the central behavioral finding of our
earlier work [11].
Correlation of BIS/BAS to search behaviour
Our primary interest was in the relationship between trait
reward-seeking - as measured by BASdrive - and the priming of
visual search by reward. Our expectation was that subjects with a
high BASdrive score would show a larger reward priming effect. In
order to test this hypothesis, per-subject BIS, BAStotal, BASdrive,
BASfun seeking, and BASreward scores were correlated with the
priming effects observed in each of the low-magnitude and high-
magnitude reward conditions. Priming effects were computed for
each of the high-magnitude and low-magnitude reward conditions
separately by subtracting the RTs observed in the no-swap
condition from those in the swap condition. Results from this
analysis, as illustrated in Table 1, revealed a strong and reliable
correlation between BASdrive and the magnitude of intertrial
priming in the high-magnitude reward condition (r= 0.476,
p = 0.004). No other correlations approached significance (all
ps.0.3). Note that correlation statistics are based on comparison
of the observed correlation to the distribution of correlation values
garnered by relating all random permutations of the data.
Scatter plots of BASdrive against intertrial priming for each of
the low-magnitude and high-magnitude reward conditions are
presented in Figure 3. Statistical analysis revealed that the
difference between these correlations was marginally significant
(t(34) = 1.616, p = 0.058 [34]). This is consistent with the idea that
the relationship between BASdrive and priming is exclusive to high-
magnitude reward; participants who score high on BASdrive do not
generally show a larger intertrial priming effect, but a specific
increase in reward priming.
Discussion
This study was motivated by the idea that participants who are
sensitive to the motivational valence of high-magnitude reward –
who are reward-seeking – would be more likely to attend to stimuli
characterized by reward-associated perceptual features and thus
would show a larger reward priming effect. We measured trait
reward sensitivity using the BIS/BAS inventory [21] and found
that the BASdrive subscale, a measure of the degree to which
Table 1. Correlations between BIS/BAS subscales and the
impact of reward on intertrial priming in each of the low-
magnitude and high-magnitude reward conditions.
BAStotal BASdrive BASfun BASreward BIS
Low-magnitude reward 0.119 0.116 0.065 0.175 20.138
High-magnitude reward 0.244 0.476 * 0.114 0.168 0.056
*p,0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014087.t001
Figure 3. Per-subject scatter plots. a.) BASdrive against intertrial priming observed in trials following low-magnitude reward, and b.) BASdrive
against intertrial priming observed in trials following high-magnitude reward. Linear fits of the data are denoted by broken lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014087.g003
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reward drives behavior, correlated strongly with the magnitude of
reward priming observed in the visual search task.
These results add to a growing literature demonstrating the
importance of reward to attentional control and attentional
learning [7,8,11,12,34]. Prior work has shown that the sustained
effect of attentional suppression – negative priming – is only
present following high-magnitude reward, suggesting that the
attentional mechanism responsible for creating this lingering
inhibition is effective only following positive outcome [7]. A
subsequent study has shown that participants are a.) able to
efficiently select stimuli that have been consistently associated with
high-magnitude reward, but have difficulty ignoring these objects,
and b.) are able to ignore distractor stimuli when doing so in prior
experience has resulted in a good outcome, but have trouble
selecting these items when they are targets [8]. It seems likely that
the pattern of results in this latter study reflects the operation of the
same attentional mechanism responsible for the reward priming
effect described here. Moreover, the perceptual and attentional
benefits stemming from reward have been shown to have an
impact on stimulus detectability, making reward-associated stimuli
less sensitive to the attentional blink [35]. The current study is
consistent with this developing literature, but also motivates a new
perspective on these results: many of these effects may be subject to
individual differences stemming from personality traits like
reward-seeking.
This study also adds to another developing field investigating
the influence of personality traits on perception and attention. To
date, much of this work has focused on trait anxiety and the
attentive response to threatening stimuli. There is substantial
evidence that highly-anxious people attend to fear-related stimuli
for longer than less anxious people and have difficulty disengaging
attention from these stimuli [36]. Even more interesting are results
suggesting that perceptual processing of fear-related stimuli is
facilitated in high-anxiety individuals. For example, work with the
visual search paradigm has demonstrated that participants who
are afraid of spiders, but not snakes, will detect spiders more
quickly than snakes, whereas participants who are afraid of snakes,
but not spiders, will detect snakes more quickly than spiders [37].
In event-related potential work, facilitated processing of threaten-
ing stimuli in high-anxiety individuals has been demonstrated as
early as the visual N1, which occurs 100 ms post-stimulus [38]. In
conjunction with our earlier work [11 12], the present results
suggest that trait reward-sensitivity can have a similar impact on
early visual mechanisms, facilitating processing of reward-
associated stimuli.
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